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Abstract: The quest for winning and preserving political 
power in Machiavelli’s The Prince is led by the bellicose ver-
sion of the pre-classical and mythological concept of metis 
or cunning rationality. In opposition to a domestic version of 
cunning rationality, understood as the rationality of the weak, 
Machiavellian mētis is a prudential and deceptive rationality 
of the strong. Bellicose cunning rationality does not, however, 
prevent the prince from falling into the hubris of violence, 
and does not avoid undermining cunning rationality itself. 
Our article evaluates and circumscribes the contribution, as 
well as the theoretical and practical limits of the Machiavel-
lian bellicose cunning rationality. 
Keywords: Cunning rationality, hubris of violence, mētis, 
political power, prudence. 
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Introduction 
Although Machiavelli did not explicitly refer to 
mētis (or cunning rationality), the fox’s attribution as 
an essential feature of the prince’s rationality (Machi-
avelli, 1998 [1515], XVIII) allows for an understand-
ing of Machiavellian political rationality as mētis. 
In the “Greek world, the fox is Cunning; in Greek a 
cunning trick can be called alopex or fox […] [a fox 
has] a mind of many nuances and a polymorphic 
intelligence which can adapt to any circumstances” 
(Detienne & Vernant, 1978 [1976], p. 35-36). That 
polymorphic intelligence includes prudence — “[…] 
mētis is an informed prudence” (Detienne & Vernant, 
1978 [1976], p. 27), which is the virtue or the excel-
lence of political rationality in Machiavellian political 
theory (Pocock, 1975). Besides following mētis, the 
well-known Machiavellian analogy between politics 
and war (Dietz, 1986; Lukes, 2004; Mansfield 1981), 
leads Machiavellian political thought to stress mētis’ 
pre-classical and mythological bellicose version 
(Homer, 2003). In Machiavellian political thought 
bellicose cunning rationality is mostly the rationality 
of the strong and not the prudential rationality of the 
weak or the “art of the weak” (De Certeau, Jameson, 
and Lovitt, 1980, 6; see also Detienne & Vernant, 
1978 [1976]; Dobel, 2006, Herzog, 2006). 
Nevertheless, since the bellicose appropriation 
of the bellicose version of the pre-classical cunning 
rationality seriously limits the influence of prudence 
in a prince’s political reasoning, we wonder if Machi-
avellian appropriation of the pre-classical cunning 
rationality does not avoid the prince’s fall into the 
hubris of violence. We also wonder if Machiavellian 
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bellicose cunning rationality, as the rationality of the 
strong, does not undermine cunning rationality itself. 
For instance, the unavoidable violence in Machi-
avellian political theory has already been stressed in 
philosophy and political theory literature (Arendt, 
1954; Baker, 2009; Frazer and Hutchings, 2011; 
Minter, 1991; Tarlton, 2003; Wolin, 2004). The rela-
tionship between that violence and cunning ration-
ality or mētis has received little attention, however. 
It is true that some authors (Detienne & Vernant, 
1978 [1976]; De Certeau, Jameson, and Lovitt, 1980; 
Dobel, 2006; Herzog, 2006; Nikodimov, 2006) have 
referred to the importance of mētis in Machiavellian 
thought. Herzog (2006) related mētis to cruelty and 
De Certeau, Jameson, and Lovitt (1980) with tactics. 
However, these approaches did not sufficiently stress 
the relationship between Machiavelli’s bellicose un-
derstanding and the hubris of violence. 
A comprehension of the relationship between 
the hubris of violence and bellicose mētis seems, 
however, important. First, it clarifies how the pru-
dential nature of mētis is undermined by the bel-
licose understanding of cunning rationality. Second, 
the comprehension of the relationship between the 
hubris of violence and mētis seems also to circum-
scribe the contribution, as well as the limits, of 
Machiavellian cunning rationality for the quest for 
winning and preserving political power. 
Based only on Machiavellian political theory issues 
presented in The Prince and with the main aims stated 
above, we analyze the bellicose Machiavellian concept 
of mētis as well as the difficulties of basing political 
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practice on the bellicose pre-classical conception of ra-
tionality. In the first paragraph we will briefly describe 
the pre-classical and mythological concept of mētis. In 
the second we will clarify the bellicose Machiavellian 
understanding of mētis, emphasizing the importance 
of prudence of the excellence of cunning rationality. 
In the third we will present the main problems with 
bellicose understanding of mētis, as the rationality of 
the strong, namely the fall into the hubris of violence. 
We also compare the bellicose understanding of mētis 
(Homer, 2003; see also Machiavelli, 1998 [1515]), as 
the rationality of the strong, with the domestic version 
as the rationality of the weak (Homer, 1996; see also 
De Certeau, Jameson, and Lovitt, 1980, and Detienne 
& Vernant, 1978 [1976]). 
In this analysis we will not dwell on the differ-
ence between actual violence and mind violence 
(Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], IX, p. 60). What is at 
stake in our essay is the concept of rationality in 
Machiavellian political thought. In this analysis we 
also consider neither Machiavelli as a political actor 
(Benner, 2014; Dietz, 1986; Wolin, 1960), nor The 
Prince as a political act of deception (Dietz, 1986), 
the realistic or rhetorical nature of Machiavellian 
political theory (Hariman, 1995), and the apparent 
discrepancies between the Discourses (Machiavelli, 
1996 [1531]) and The Prince (Dietz, 1986; Fallon, 
1992; Ingersoll, 1986; Leonard, 1984; Pocock, 1985). 
Mētis: unpredictability, and the intelligence 
of the weak 
With the lion-fox metaphor, Machiavelli proposes 
the pre-classical concept of rationality or mētis 
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dealing with the unpredictability of the political 
struggle in a changing world. Since to deal with 
political unpredictability requires that the princes 
rationality fosters his or her own unpredictability, 
foxes are the symbol of cunning rationality, or 
mētis, because they not only recognize snares, but 
are also pretenders, dissemblers, traitors, and are 
unpredictable (Machiavelli 1998, [1515], XVIII, XIX; 
see also Blanchard, 1984; Pitkin, 1984; Rebhorn, 
1988). Lions are the symbol of strength.
Associated in Greek mythology and poetry (Hom-
er, 1996; see Dobel, 2006; Detienne & Vernant, 1978 
[1976]; Dobel, 2006; Herzog, 2006), with the political 
concept of power, mētis is a complex of flair, sagacity, 
foresight, flexibility of mind, resourcefulness, vigilant 
attention, the sense of opportunity, and extensive 
experience (Detienne & Vernant, 1978 [1976]). Mētis 
is also a kind of practical knowledge, which involves 
calculation and thought, and allows ensuring the 
achievement and preservation of sovereign power 
when a political agent has to confront uncertainty 
and unpredictability. For example, Zeus’s rational-
ity, identified with cunning rationality (Herzog, 
2006; Vernant, 1990), allows him to always guess 
the unexpected pitfalls, surprises, and traps that 
would threaten his power. Predicting or calculating 
the pitfalls, whose avoidance requires not only his 
pre-vision, but also practical action to prevent their 
success, allows Zeus to win and preserve power. 
That avoidance is not done, however, in a manner 
that is predictable from the perspective of his op-
ponents. Zeus ought to be able to astutely anticipate 
the implementation of the wiles of his enemies, 
abort them, and thus preserve his power over the 
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gods of Olympus. From this perspective mētis is an 
informed prudence able to “foresee the unforesee-
able” (Detienne & Vernant, 1978 [1976], p. 27).
In addition, mētis arises in situations of confron-
tation and competition that can be gained through 
force — the stronger overcomes the weaker — or by 
cunning, in which the weaker manages against all 
odds to overcome the stronger (Detienne & Vernant, 
1978 [1976]; Dobel, 2006). The duel between Odys-
seus and the Cyclops is a clear example of cunning 
rationality, in which the strength of the Cyclops is 
defeated by the cunning of Odysseus. Clever and 
thoughtful, Odysseus was named Nobody, surprising 
and defeating the powerful Cyclops. Crying to the 
Cyclops, and asking for help, he said that Nobody 
kills him, by cunning and not by violence (Homer, 
1996, 9, 414-455). Also, in those situations in which 
the weaker manages against all odds to defeat the 
stronger, the astute person is at the same time com-
pletely focused on current events and on a future in 
which he or she establishes some options in advance 
(Detienne & Vernant, 1978 [1976]). Odysseus pa-
tiently waited for the moment to blind the Cyclops 
and when it arose, his full-minded focus on imple-
menting his plan, allowed him to achieve his goal. 
Besides the conflict between Odysseus and the 
Cyclops, the Trojan horse is another example of cun-
ning rationality. Mentioned in The Odyssey (Homer, 
1996, 8.84-95 and 11. 252ff), the Trojan horse was a 
snare that the Greeks used to enter the city of Troy 
and win the war. After a fruitless 10-year siege, the 
Greeks constructed a huge hollow wooden horse 
and hid warriors inside. Pretending to desert the 
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war, they persuaded the Trojans that the horse was 
an offering to Athena (goddess of war) that would 
make Troy impregnable. The Trojans took the horse 
inside the city gates and that night the Greek war-
riors crept out of the horse and opened the gates to 
let in the returning Greek army. The Greeks entered 
and destroyed the city of Troy, decisively ending the 
war, as depicted in The Iliad (Homer, 2003). 
Although in both cases Odysseus follows cunning 
rationality, there are two main differences between 
these cases. If The Iliad (Homer, 2003) shows us 
the absolute prevalence of the state of war (Jaeger, 
1946 [1936]), The Odyssey (Homer, 1996) depicts 
Odysseus’ vicissitudes in his everyday domestic 
life, after the war (Jaeger, 1946 [1936]). Indeed, the 
Trojan horse cunning occurs in a fierce conflict 
between the Trojans and Achaeans (the Greeks). 
The use of horse expedient, a means to win the 
war, was followed by the violent destruction of the 
city of Troy. The Nobody cunning snare takes place 
in The Odyssey, where Odysseus tries to recover 
multiple losses, his power, liberty, family, friends, 
and home. Odysseus blinds the Cyclops to escape 
from prison, and not as an attempt to conquer the 
Cyclops’ island. Odysseus’ vicissitudes in his everyday 
domestic life (Homer, 1996) and in the state of war 
(Homer, 2003) are led by mētis. However, cunning 
rationality (Homer, 2003) under the prevalence of 
the state of war not only implies violence, as it occurs 
in the fight between Odysseus and the Cyclops, but 
also the hubris of violence (e.g. The Greeks entered 
and destroyed the city of Troy). Mētis description 
under war includes one of the most disturbing fea-
tures of the war, the possibility of annihilating the 
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adversary. For instance, the difference between the 
domestic and the bellicose mētis does not refer to 
the difference between a private or personal and 
political or public rationality, but to the difference 
between annihilating the adversary or not. From 
the perspective of bellicose rationality it would not 
be enough to blind the Cyclops. It would also be 
necessary to kill him and to destroy his island. Thus, 
if Odysseus had been led by the hubris of violence, 
mētis description in the Odyssey would correspond 
to bellicose and not domestic mētis. Similarly, if the 
Trojan war were led by domestic mētis, the Greeks 
would enter Troy, but not destroy it. They could 
imprison, or even kill, the politically powerful, but 
they would leave Troy intact. In other words, political 
rationality, as a public rationality, can be described 
under a domestic and bellicose rationality. 
When approaching the Machiavellian concept 
of mētis we ought to have in mind these two dif-
ferent political contexts of the pre-classical and 
mythological tradition, more so than the well-
known Machiavellian analogy between politics and 
war (Dietz, 1986; Lukes, 2004; Mansfield, 1981). 
Cunning rationality of Machiavelli’s prince results 
from the transfer into politics of the state of war’s 
wiles, and his inheritance of pre-classic and mytho-
logical cunning rationality is mostly related with 
The Iliad (Homer, 2003). From this perspective, 
although Machiavelli politics does not dismiss the 
importance of peace in politics, political activity’s 
main aim is to annihilate all the adversaries that 
threaten princes’ acquisition and preservation of 
power. It is not casual when discoursing about the 
animal nature of princes (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], 
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XVIII) that Machiavelli explicitly refers to Achilles 
(Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XVIII, p. 69), the hero 
of The Iliad (Homer, 2003). Achilles is linked to 
the leonine animal part of the prince, and fox cun-
ning rationality is related to Achilles in the battle 
field and not to Odysseus’ vicissitudes of domestic 
life. It is also not casual that Achilles is the model 
of princes who master the art of war (Machiavelli, 
1998 [1515]), XIV, p. 60). 
For now, and regardless of the two versions of 
cunning rationality, Machiavelli recurs to cunning 
rationality when he asks the prince to ally with time 
(Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XXV). The recourse to 
cunning rationality is also present in: a) the descrip-
tion of the conquest of power by perfidy (Machi-
avelli, 1998 [1515], VIII); b) the behavior of nobles’ 
“foresight and more astuteness” (Machiavelli, 1998 
[1515], IX); c) the praise of the utility of the appear-
ance of virtue (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XVIII); 
d) the emergence in time of the political action 
(Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XXV); e) the fox’s elec-
tion as an essential feature of the prince’s rationality 
(Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XVIII); and finally the 
identification of Fortuna as an inconstant and un-
stable woman (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XXV), who 
represents the uncertainty in the struggle for power. 
Mētis: deceptive prudent cunning rationality 
Besides mētis’ multiple, diverse, changing char-
acter, and its transfiguring and masking power 
(Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XXV), we emphasize that 
the fox’s attribution as an essential feature of the 
prince’s rationality referring to his centauric nature 
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(half man and half beast (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], 
XVIII, p. 69)), mainly to his half beast nature. Foxes 
help fierce lions to recognize snares (Machiavelli, 
1998 [1515], XVIII), and to temper and moder-
ate their ferocity (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XIX). 
Recognizing snares and tempering and moderating 
lions’ ferocity allows for an understanding that not 
only is a cunning prince a prudent one, but also 
prudence can be seen as the excellence of the prince’s 
cunning rationality.
 Indeed, in the perspective of cunning rationality, 
prudence is a highly valuable virtue. In reality, on the 
one hand, mētis requires moderation, temperance, 
humanity, and wisdom (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], 
XVII); on the other hand, cunning rationality implies 
capacity to foresee future events (Machiavelli, 1998 
[1515], III). Finally, a good use of cruelty is related 
to the prudential rule of “picking the less bad as 
good” (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XXI, p. 91). This 
rule allows a carefully (prudent) measured applica-
tion of cruelty, which excludes hatred, and can help 
them to acquire and preserve power. For instance, 
in the struggle for power and when they need to do 
evil, princes ought to follow the rule of “picking the 
less bad as good” (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XXI, 
p. 91). Guided by prudence (prudenzia), this rule 
allows that princes moderate and temper their cruel 
nature, and apply their cruelty well, to avoid losing 
power and life. For example, Antoninus [Caracalla] 
“ferocity and cruelty were so great and so unheard 
of — for after infinite individual killings he had put 
to death a great part of the people of Rome and all 
the people of Alexandria — that he became most 
hateful to all the world […] so that he was killed by 
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a centurion in the midst of his army” (Machiavelli, 
1998 [1515], XIX, p. 79). Commodus and Maximi-
nus had the same fate (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], 
XIX). Since princes personify political community, 
Caracalla’s homicide was not personal and private, 
but corresponds to the homicide of the political 
community. 
In opposition to Antoninus [Caracalla], whose 
ferocity and cruelty were so great that he became 
most hateful to the entire world, Severus was able 
to mask his ferocity, and cruelty through deception. 
He dissimulated his aspiration to throne, pretended 
he was willing to share the throne with his enemy, 
Albinus, deceived the Senate by accusing Albinus 
of treachery, and had a pretext by which to take 
from him his government and life (Machiavelli, 
1998 [1515], VII, VIII, XIX, p. 77-79). As prudent 
political rationality, Machiavellian bellicose cunning 
rationality also comprises deception, i.e. dissimula-
tion, unpredictability, betrayal, infidelity, perfidy, 
corruption, and murder (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], 
VII, VIII, XIX). For example, Machiavelli’s bellicose 
cunning rationality foresight of the prince’s rivals’ 
attacks is complemented by those deceptive prac-
tices. When choosing the means by which to resist 
the destructive effects their enemies’ attacks, princes 
ought first to anticipate the implementation of the 
wiles of the selfish politicians, and neutralize them. 
Second, they must themselves implement the snares 
(the wicked or nefarious designs — scelleratezza) to 
deceive their competitors and win political power. 
In Machiavelli’s political thought, prudence not 
only moderates ferocity and encourages deception, 
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but also limits the political effects of fidelity. Really, 
prudence required that princes ought to follow the 
rule of “breaking their promises”. “A prudent lord, 
therefore, cannot observe faith, nor should he, 
when such observance turns against him, and the 
causes that made him promise have been eliminated” 
(Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XVIII, p. 69). Since the 
acquisition or preservation of power under cunning 
rationality depends partially on prudence, when 
Machiavelli states that “[…] many peace treaties 
and promises have been rendered invalid and vain 
through the infidelity of princes; and the one who 
has known best how to use the fox has come out 
best” (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XVIII, p. 69-70), the 
relationship between prudence and bellicose cunning 
rationality is once again reaffirmed. “Picking the 
less bad as good” and “cannot observe the faith” are 
rules of a prudential cunning rationality. Thus, even 
if there is nowhere in Machiavellian political thought 
a clear statement about the virtue or the excellence 
of rationality, as it happens with phronesis in Aristo-
telian ethical and political thought (Aristotle, 1999, 
2002), the prudent cunning rationality corresponds 
to a political virtuous reason. Consequently, although 
the concept of virtù defies definition, and is highly 
controversial in the political theory of Machiavelli 
(Fallon, 1992; Greene, 1986; Kahn, 1986; McCanles, 
1983; Pocock, 1975), prudence designs the excellence 
of a prince’s cunning rationality. For example, when 
dissimulating to aspire to the throne, pretending he 
was willing to share the throne with his enemy, and 
deceiving the Senate by accusing his rival Albinus 
of treachery, with the intent of taking from him 
his government and life (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], 
XIX), Severus is the example of politically virtuous 
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cunning rationality. Machiavelli explicitly says that 
“whoever examines minutely the actions of this man 
will find him a very fierce lion and a very astute fox” 
(Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XIX, p. 79). 
Difficulties with bellicose cunning ra-
tionality: inflexibility and the hubris of 
violence 
Cunning rationality may face difficulty in complete-
ly overcoming the destructive effects their enemies’ 
attacks, not only because absolute foresight and the 
avoidance of fatal errors are humanly impossible, but 
also human beings also lack all the required virtues 
or the ability of a flexible use of virtues to face future 
troubles (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XXV). For exam-
ple, even though the prince can be an extraordinary 
human being, “above the level of ordinary human-
ity” (Pocock, 1975, p. 170), he still remains human, 
and cannot avoid losing his or her power for reasons 
completely beyond his or her control. With Cesare 
Borgia’s recourse to his wiles, crushing the Orsini 
(Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], VII), executing his swift 
and cruel Messer Remirro de Orco in Cesena Square 
(charging him for the full responsibility of political 
cruelties) (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], VII), he overcame 
his enemies by force and fraud and exterminated those 
who had power or reason to hurt him. Given that 
Cesare Borgia committed only one error, choosing 
Pope Julius Second — “the duke erred in this choice 
and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin” (Machiavelli, 
1998 [1515], VII, p. 33) — his exemplary deceptive 
practices were not enough to preserve his power. So, 
common mortals can learn from their mistakes, and 
mētis can be understood as the adequate rationality 
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for mere mortals in dangerous times, remaining “plau-
sible today [because we are not] superman” (Dobel, 
2006, p. 225) Machiavelli’s description of the prince’s 
rational behavior stresses, however, a peculiar feature 
of political life, namely not only that any mistake can 
risk the loss of his or her attempt to gain or preserve 
power, but that it is also irreparable. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that prudence 
should govern fortune, the emphasis on prudence 
as cautiousness (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XXV) 
seems to challenge the princes’ power. Among the 
not-always compatible meanings of prudence (e.g. 
the capacity to foresee future events, temperance and 
humanity, wisdom (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], III, 
XVII, and XXI, respectively) the peculiar knowledge 
of prudence is mostly related to cautiousness (res-
petto) — which still remains in its modern concep-
tion (Annas, 1995; Nichols and White, 1999). Not 
only is being cautious opposed to having too much 
confidence (Machiavelli 1998 [1515], XVII), and to 
impetuosity (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XXV), but 
also the two qualities (cautiousness and impetuos-
ity) are rarely attributes of a single individual. The 
vast majority of human beings are either one or 
the other. Nonetheless, when human beings do not 
possess both qualities, it is better to be impetuous 
that cautious, as “the cautious man, when it is time 
to come to impetuosity, does not know how to do 
it, hence comes to ruin” (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], 
XXV, p. 100). Since the time to come to impetuosity 
is related to the overcoming of Fortuna, cautiousness 
deals with Fortuna with difficulty. Consequently, 
instead of helping the prince to overcome the above-
mentioned weaknesses, prudence as cautiousness 
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also prevents the prince from dominating fortune, 
leading him to political defeat. Unlike the wise and 
prudent prince, the impetuous prince (e.g. “Julius 
[…] accomplished with his impetuous move what 
no other pontiff, with all human prudence, would 
ever have accomplished” (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], 
XXV, p. 100). Truly, Machiavelli argues that if Pope 
Julius had needed to proceed with caution, he would 
be ruined (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XXV, p. 101). 
We have, then, to be cautious when over-evaluating 
the princes’ impetuosity. Nevertheless, when Machi-
avelli clearly states “that it is better to be impetuous 
than cautious, because fortune is a woman; and it 
is necessary, if one wants to hold her down, to beat 
her and strike her down” (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], 
XXV, p. 101), the equivalence between impetuosity 
and cautiousness is sustained with great difficulty. 
Moreover, the fact of beating Fortuna and striking 
her down is not a negligible issue, because Fortuna 
represents the uncertainty, inconstancy and unpre-
dictability in the struggle for power (Machiavelli, 
1998 [1515], III, VI, VII, XIII, XXV). Consequently, 
when princes deal with uncertainty and unpredict-
ability, the subordination of prudence or the excel-
lence of cunning rationality to impetuosity entails, 
then, falling into violence and depriving princes 
of their polymorphic human nature, mainly their 
deceptive, but also prudent, adaptable, and unpre-
dictable fox’s cunning rationality. 
In effect when prudence as cautiousness prevents 
the prince from dominating fortune, leading him 
to political defeat, the prince can always recur to 
laws (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XVIII). However, 
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cunning rationality, corresponding to the animal 
part of the prince, was justly invoked, because the 
juridical coercion of power is not enough to compel 
obedience (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XVIII). Thus, 
when laws, together with cunning rationality, do 
not allow winning or preserving power, princes 
seem to have no other choice than to appeal to the 
last resource available to him — not violence, but 
the hubris of violence. Actually, in Machiavellian 
political theory prudent cunning rationality is si-
multaneously related to the rules “picking the less 
bad as good” (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], XXI, p. 91) 
and “breaking their promises” (Machiavelli, 1998 
[1515], XVIII, p. 69-70). If, in accordance with the 
unpredictable nature of fortune, princes follow the 
rule of “to break promises”, the withdrawal of cau-
tions behavior implies giving up the rule “picking 
the less bad as good”. When following this rule, 
the cautious prudent prince moderates the use of 
violence, to give up of prudence as caution, recur-
ring to impetuosity, and implies that princes have 
no measure to apply cruelty. When princes rely on 
their own impetuous and fierce leonine nature, 
such as Pope Julius II’s “ferocity and impetuosity” 
(Machiavelli 1998, XXV: 100), they lack any politi-
cal measure offered by their prudent, cautious, and 
adaptable fox’s cunning rationality. The impetuous 
and ruthless prince annihilates, then, his or her 
enemies beyond law and ruse. 
The main problem with bellicose cunning ra-
tionality is not, however, to establish a relationship 
between political power and violence, or to attribute 
cruelty to the new prince, as Machiavelli did (Machi-
avelli, 1998 [1515], VIII, XVIII). On the contrary, 
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Machiavellian crystalline acknowledgment that 
political power cannot be dissociated from violence 
(Arendt, 1954; Baker, 2009; Frazer and Hutchings, 
2011; Minter, 1991; Tarlton, 2003; Wolin, 2004) can 
be seen as one of his main theoretical contributions 
to political theory and practice (Wolin, 2004). The 
awareness of violence as an unavoidable feature of 
political power can be tempered and moderated 
by the juridical and administrative political ap-
paratus, relating political power to “an economy of 
violence” (Wolin, 2004, p.197-205). In addition, the 
construction of a community, mainly a new com-
munity, requires the use of “creative” violence inside 
or outside communities, when violence transforms 
into war. From this perspective, the immorality of 
cruel and deceptive practices is not a problem in 
itself. Thus, although the relationships between eth-
ics with the political normativity in Machiavellian 
political theory, in general (Hösle, 1999; Pocock, 
1975; Wolin, 2004), and between cunning rational-
ity and morality, in particular (Herzog, 2006), are 
a matter of dispute, deceptive cunning rational-
ity is beyond moral good and evil. This does not 
mean, however, that mētis is beyond political good 
and evil — the greater political rational evil is the 
prince’s falling into an unrestricted, unlimited, ex-
treme, and uncontrolled violence. For example, the 
requirement to “break promises” can be ethically 
objectionable, but politically acceptable. Equally, 
the rules of “picking the less bad as good” (Machi-
avelli, 1998 [1515], XXI, p. 91) and “do benefits by 
little” (Machiavelli, 1998 [1515], VIII, p. 38) can 
also be politically justifiable. On the contrary, what-
ever its nature — realistic or rhetorical (Hariman, 
1995) — the rule “to beat her [Fortuna] and strike 
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her down” is politically undesirable. For instance, 
on the one hand, considering that the inconstancy 
and unpredictability of Fortuna also expresses the 
inconstancy and unpredictability of foxes, to “beat 
and strike down” subsumes any political endeavor by 
the requirement to definitively overcome unpredict-
able behaviors. On the other hand, accepting that 
cunning rationality is a practical knowledge, which 
allows a political agent to confront unpredictability 
without overcoming it definitively, the bellicose 
side of cunning rationality simultaneously expels 
astuteness and any quest of political measure. Thus, 
despite the fact that Machiavelli implicitly contrasts 
his theoretical political research with the utopian and 
idealistic philosophical approach of Plato (Machi-
avelli, 1998 [1515], XV), both approaches expel 
mētis. While Plato (1902) expelled mētis based on 
the requirements of a mathematical concept of ra-
tionality (Plato 1902), and Machiavelli expelled it 
based, mostly, on the prerequisite of violent force, 
both approaches conclude that mētis cannot guide 
political reasoning.
Bellicose cunning rationality as the ra-
tionality of the strong
Since politicians have the power to definitively 
overcome unpredictable behaviors imposed on 
them, cunning rationality is not understood as 
the rationality of the weak or the “art of the weak” 
(De Certeau, Jameson, and Lovitt, 1980, 6; see also 
Detienne & Vernant, 1978 [1976]; Dobel, 2006, 
Herzog, 2006), but that of the strong. Machiavellian 
bellicose conception of mētis subverts the underly-
ing main assumption of mythological description of 
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cunning rationality, which supposes that the decep-
tive practices of the weak (the Greeks or Odysseus) 
ought to be victorious over the force of the strong 
(The Trojans or the Cyclops). 
To understand cunning rationality as the rationality of 
the strong seems, however, not politically sound. 
First, as the rationality of the strong, cunning 
rationality gives the power to definitively overcome 
unpredictable behaviors. In effect, the bellicose con-
ception of mētis, as the rationality of the strongest, is 
related to the belief that there is a complete political 
victory, in this case, over unpredictability. On the 
contrary, domestic deceptive practices of cunning 
rationality not only seem reasonable in everyday 
life, in which someone does not have the power to 
definitively overcome unpredictable behaviors imposed 
on her/him, but also can be seen as political decep-
tive practices of the weak. For example, De Certeau, 
Jameson, and Lovitt (1980) invoke cunning tactical 
rationality as the rationality of the weakest, contrast-
ing it with the strategic rationality of the powerful. 
Tactics are calculated actions which are determined 
by the absence of a proper place. Strategies are a 
specific kind of knowing, which “transforms the un-
certainties of history into readable spaces [and] gives 
the power of giving itself a proper place”. From De 
Certeau, Jameson, and Lovitt’s (1980) perspective the 
difference between strategy and tactics, along with 
the distinction between visibility and invisibility — 
weaker are invisible — allows a space of resistance in 
public life, and seems fruitful to explain the avoidance 
of the hubris of violence. In opposition, Machiavelli 
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not only places deceptive practices against the real 
or imaginary enemies of the prince at the heart of 
power, he also identifies the locus of power with a 
great opacity, which can preclude political resist-
ance. Symmetrically, even politicians cannot protect 
themselves against invisible enemies, and given that 
princes are not able to foresee their wiles, the “dread of 
annihilation” (Major, 2007) can transform the prince 
himself into a watchman, or even worse, a violent and 
paranoid political agent led by continuous suspicion. 
Even acknowledging the differences between the two 
approaches of mētis (e.g. the cunning intelligence to 
weak, and strategic intelligence to powerful), following 
Homer’s The Odyssey (1996), De Certeau, Jameson, 
and Lovitt (1980) and offer a plausible conception of 
political cunning rationality, related to the powerless 
and not to the strongest. 
Second, as the rationality of the strongest, decep-
tive prudent practices to thwart unpredictability 
increases suspicion and untruthfulness among po-
litical agents, which in turn creates a violent public 
realm, and isolates the prince from his community. 
Third, bellicose cunning rationality implies if not 
the refusal of any political rationality, the victory of 
rationality of violence, whatever the rationality may 
be of this violence in Machiavellian thought. Even 
if mētis would not be expelled from political life, 
in the worst scenario bellicose cunning rationality 
can be seen as the proper rationality of violence, as 
Kenney (2010) has already evidenced. 
Summing up, although Machiavellian crystal-
line acknowledgment that political power cannot 
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be dissociated from violence can be seen as one 
of his main theoretical contributions to political 
theory and practice, instead of following a bellicose 
conception of mētis, political rationality should 
follow the domestic one, such as introduced in 
The Odyssey (Homer 1996). Even if the political 
rationality under the domestic version does not 
avoid circumstantially the need of fierce impetu-
osity, the endless quest of a prudential measure 
to apply cruelty prevents overcoming definitively 
unpredictable behaviors, and allows a never-ending 
‘interplay’ between unpredictability and power. Ac-
cordingly, the struggle for political power is better 
understood under a domestic version of mētis, along 
the analogy between politics and everyday life, than 
to the bellicose version of cunning rationality and 
the corresponding analogy between politics and 
war. Since this analogy reduces any political life to 
a matter of absolute destruction of the adversaries 
(e.g. The Greeks entered and destroyed the city of 
Troy), the struggle for political power is reduced 
to a fierce battle of impetuous political agents who 
lack any quest of political measure to fight against 
their adversaries. It is not surprising that the bel-
licose cunning rationality underlying that analogy 
plunges us into the abyss of violence’s hubris. 
Additionally, even if the hubris of violence could 
and should require rational calculation, the ra-
tionality under that unmeasured frame can be 
understood as imprudent, unwise, barbarian, and 
intemperate reason, i.e. as a vicious reason. Thus, 
beyond the unavoidable risk of different historical 
contexts — pre-classical antiquity, Renaissance, and 
the democratic and global world — the attempt to 
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deal with unpredictability, intensifying it through 
endless bellicose practices, fosters the acquisition 
and preservation of power only with great difficulty. 
We remind the reader that Antoninus Caracalla’s 
hubris of violence made him so hateful to all the 
world that he was killed. The acquisition and pres-
ervation of power is, then, better attained through 
a prudential cunning rationality, which subsumes 
all deceptive and bellicose practices under a quest 
of political measure. Therefore, the insufficiency of 
political wiles to vanquish unpredictable fortune 
ought not to be replaced by unmeasured political 
rationality. Otherwise, although one may acknowl-
edge the risks of the hubris of violence (Machiavelli, 
1998 [1515]), the impossibility of foreseeing princes’ 
enemies’ wiles, and the possibility of being defeated 
by them, allows annihilating any political adversary 
beyond law and mētis. 
Conclusion 
Mythological rationality to politics challenges 
mainly the political practice of a new prince, who 
builds a new principality or communities. Referring 
to a pre-classical conception of rationality, Machiavel-
lian bellicose mētis seems the most suitable political 
reasoning to deal with the unpredictability of political 
life, in general, and with the practice of a new prince, 
who builds a new principality or communities, in par-
ticular. Actually, although we agree with De Certeau, 
Jameson, and Lovitt’s (1980) approach to mētis, which 
stresses the main features of the pre-classical concep-
tion of rationality, also referred to by Detienne and 
Vernant (1978 [1976]) and Herzog (2006), we sustain 
that the specific political approach of Machiavelli 
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seems to be inconsistent with his main premises of 
political thought (e.g. the cautious and prudent use of 
cruelty). We also show that bellicose cunning ration-
ality can also lead to violent hubris, simultaneously 
expels astuteness and any quest of political measure 
and fosters the acquisition and preservation of power 
only with great difficulty. Finally, although Machi-
avellian cunning rationality has limitations, it helps 
us to understand that bellicose cunning rationality 
cannot be a proper conception of political rationality 
in a changing and impermanent world. 
Future research could analyze the differences and 
similarities between Machiavellian bellicose mētis 
and contemporary approaches of cunning rationality 
(Herzog 2006, Scott 1998) different from De Certeau, 
Jameson, and Lovitt (1984). Future research could also 
evaluate the theoretical contribution of these contem-
porary approaches to political theory and practice. 
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